Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina\u27s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record by Pollitt, Daniel R. & Warren, Brittany P.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 94 | Number 6 Article 3
9-1-2016
Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina's
Remarkable Appellate Batson Record
Daniel R. Pollitt
Brittany P. Warren
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina's Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L.
Rev. 1957 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol94/iss6/3
94 N.C. L. REV. 1957 (2016) 
THIRTY YEARS OF DISAPPOINTMENT: 
NORTH CAROLINA’S REMARKABLE 
APPELLATE BATSON RECORD* 
DANIEL R. POLLITT** & BRITTANY P. WARREN*** 
On April 30, 1986, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Batson v. Kentucky. The opinion reiterated 
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of race 
during jury selection. The Court provided what is now a familiar 
three-step framework for determining whether purposeful 
discrimination against minority jurors has occurred. Since its 
decision in Batson, the Supreme Court has continued to explore 
issues arising within this framework and has offered further 
guidance in adjudicating Batson claims.  
Our research examines North Carolina’s disappointing Batson 
record in the thirty years since the decision was handed down. In 
the 114 cases decided on the merits by North Carolina appellate 
courts, the courts have never found a substantive Batson 
violation where a prosecutor has articulated a reason for the 
peremptory challenge of a minority juror. In all of the seventy-
four cases decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
during that time, that court has never once found a substantive 
Batson violation. In contrast, over the past thirty years every state 
appellate court located in the Fourth Circuit has found at least 
one substantive Batson violation where the State struck a 
minority juror. North Carolina’s remarkable record is even more 
disappointing in the light of recent studies finding the existence of 
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pervasive prosecutorial racial discrimination in North Carolina 
jury selection.  
In an attempt to explain this record, this Article maintains that 
North Carolina courts misapply Batson jurisprudence in several 
important ways, namely at the first and third step of the 
framework. This article concludes that North Carolina courts 
should implement a correct application of Batson’s principles in 
order to provide minority defendants a fair shot at eliminating 
racial discrimination in jury selection at trial. 
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In light of the recent thirtieth anniversary of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky,1 decided April 30, 
1986, it seems appropriate to pause and consider the record compiled 
by the North Carolina appellate courts over the last thirty years in 
adjudicating Batson claims.2 Briefly, that record is remarkable and 
disappointing: North Carolina’s highest court has never once in those 
thirty years found a substantive Batson violation.3 As other courts 
have observed, “[s]tatistics are not, of course, the whole answer, but 
nothing is as emphatic as zero.”4 
In Batson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the State from exercising peremptory 
challenges against potential jurors on the basis of race.5 In its earlier 
 
 1.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 2.  This analysis seems especially timely in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Foster v. Chatman, where the Court reaffirmed and applied 
Batson to reverse the Georgia Supreme Court and find a Batson violation. Foster v. 
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016). 
 3.  A “substantive Batson violation” refers here to an appellate court’s holding that 
the State has engaged in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges against minority jurors. 
 4.  E.g., United States v. Hinds Cty. Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 5.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 84–86 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)); 
see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 
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decision in Swain v. Alabama,6 however, the Court had held that a 
criminal defendant could not prove such discrimination absent a 
showing of systematic and repeated discrimination “in case after case, 
whatever the circumstances.”7 The Batson Court overruled Swain on 
this point, reasoning that Swain had “placed on defendants a crippling 
burden of proof” and made “prosecutors’ peremptory 
challenges	.	.	.	largely immune from constitutional scrutiny.”8 To 
replace Swain, the Batson Court established a three-step framework 
for determining whether the State engaged in purposeful racial 
discrimination against minority jurors in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges at one particular criminal trial.9 That thirty-year-old 
framework is now familiar: first, the defendant must establish a prima 
facie case by showing that the circumstances at trial raise an inference 
of discrimination; second, if the defendant succeeds, the burden shifts 
to the State to offer a race-neutral reason for the peremptory 
challenge; and third, if the State succeeds, the court must then 
determine if the defendant has met his or her ultimate burden of 
proving purposeful discrimination.10 In several post-Batson decisions, 
discussed in some detail below, the Supreme Court has addressed 
legal issues raised within the basic Batson framework, such as the 
degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case and the 
importance of comparative juror analysis.11 
Part I sets forth the record compiled by the North Carolina 
appellate courts in Batson cases over the last thirty years. Part II then 
contrasts that record to the findings in a recent academic study of 
state prosecutors’ peremptory challenges. Part III demonstrates how 
that record is the result of state court misapplications of United States 
Supreme Court Batson jurisprudence, and Part IV compares that 
record to the Batson records in North Carolina’s neighboring states. 
To conclude, this Article suggests that North Carolina appellate 
courts begin correctly applying the Batson framework and 
jurisprudence so as to provide a fair chance to eliminate a species of 
racial discrimination in our state. 
 
 6.  380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 7.  Id. at 223; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 91–92. 
 8.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93. 
 9.  Id. at 96–98. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–66 (2005) (observing that “[t]he 
numbers” describing the State’s use of peremptory challenges in that case were 
“remarkable”). 
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I.  THE APPELLATE BATSON RECORD IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Since 1986, and as of September 6, 2016,12 the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has decided seventy-four cases on the merits in which 
it adjudicated eighty-one Batson claims raised by criminal defendants 
over alleged racial discrimination against minority jurors in the State’s 
exercise of peremptory challenges at criminal trials.13 To date, that 
court has not found a substantive Batson violation in any of those 
cases.14 In seventy-one of those seventy-four cases, that court found 
no Batson error whatsoever.15 In the three remaining cases, that court 
held the trial court erred at Batson’s first step in finding no prima 
facie case existed and conducted or ordered further review.16 
However, none of these three cases has ultimately resulted in the 
holding of a substantive Batson violation.17 
Since 1986, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has decided 
forty-two cases in which it has adjudicated forty-three Batson claims 
on the merits, also involving many more jurors than claims.18 In thirty-
seven of those forty-two cases, that court found no Batson error 
whatsoever.19 In two cases, the court found the defendant had 
established a prima facie case at Batson’s first step and remanded for 
consideration at Batson’s third step, but neither case ultimately 
 
 12.  The North Carolina appellate courts’ last decision day before this Article’s print 
date. 
 13.  See infra Addendum, Table 1. The claims involved far more than eighty jurors. In 
a few cases, the court has adjudicated two different claims in one case; for example, the 
court may find no Batson error at step one as to some jurors and no Batson violation at 
step three as to other jurors. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 138–40, 505 S.E.2d 
277, 288–90 (1998). Please note that this analysis includes only published decisions. 
Unpublished decisions do not reveal any additional grants of Batson relief. The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision finding a prima facie case in State v. Quick, 116 N.C. 
App. 362, 448 S.E.2d 149 (1994), was both unpublished and reversed on further review by 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina. State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 146, 462 S.E.2d 186, 
190 (1995); see infra notes 45, 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra Addendum, Table 1. 
 15.  See infra Addendum, Table 1. 
 16.  State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 342–45, 572 S.E.2d 108, 126–28 (2002); State v. 
Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 553–55, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722–23 (1998); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 
123–27, 400 S.E.2d 712, 725–28 (1991). Barden was remanded for consideration at Batson’s 
third step and litigation is currently ongoing. See State v. Barden, 362 N.C. 277, 280, 658 
S.E.2d 654, 655 (2008). On remand in Hoffman, the trial judge held there was no 
purposeful discrimination at Batson’s third step, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
affirmed on further appeal. State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 173, 505 S.E.2d 80, 84 (1998). 
Finally, in Smith, the Supreme Court of North Carolina itself found no purposeful 
discrimination at Batson’s third step. Smith, 328 N.C. at 123–27, 400 S.E.2d at 725–28. 
 17.  Barden, 356 N.C. at 342–45, 572 S.E.2d at 126–28; Hoffman, 349 N.C. at 167, 505 
S.E.2d at 84; Smith, 328 N.C. at 126–127, 400 S.E.2d at 725–28. 
 18.  See infra Addendum, Table 2. 
 19.  See infra Addendum, Table 2. 
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resulted in the finding of a substantive Batson violation.20 To date, 
that court has found a substantive Batson violation involving minority 
jurors in only one case, which involved very unusual facts.21 In State v. 
Wright,22 the defendant objected to the challenge of seven black 
jurors; the prosecutor stated reasons for striking five of the jurors, but 
did not state any specific reason for striking the other two.23 On 
appeal, the court observed that unlike all other previous North 
Carolina Batson cases, where prosecutors had provided reasons for 
“each and every” strike, the Wright prosecutor “had not even offered 
any explanation as to two jurors” or “specifically mentioned” the two 
jurors “at all.”24 The court held that in the absence of any stated 
reason for the strikes, “it follows that the peremptory challenges 
[were] not allowed.”25 
Two of the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ forty-two cases 
involve successful “reverse Batson” claims where the court found 
purposeful discrimination against white jurors challenged by black 
defendants.26 In State v. Cofield,27 the defendant challenged four of six 
white jurors.28 The trial judge allowed one strike but found a prima 
facie case as to the other three.29 Although the defendant gave many 
demeanor- and non-demeanor-based reasons for his strikes, the trial 
judge held that all of those reasons were pretext and required the 
three jurors to serve.30 On appeal, the court held the 66% “strike 
rate” established a prima facie case and relied on comparative juror 
analysis to uphold the finding of a reverse Batson violation.31 In State 
v. Hurd,32 the black defendant challenged a white juror who, when 
 
 20.  State v. McCord, 140 N.C. App. 634, 653–54, 538 S.E.2d 630, 645–46 (2000); State 
v. Hall, 104 N.C. App. 375, 381–84, 410 S.E.2d 76, 79–81 (1991). On remand in these two 
cases the trial courts found no purposeful discrimination and those holdings were affirmed 
on appeal. State v. McCord, 158 N.C. App. 693, 696–99, 582 S.E.2d 33, 35–37 (2003); State 
v. Sessoms, 119 N.C. App. 1, 4–7, 458 S.E.2d 200, 202–04 (1995). 
 21.  See State v. Wright, 189 N.C. App. 346, 352–54, 658 S.E.2d 60, 64–65 (2008). 
 22.  189 N.C. App. 346, 658 S.E.2d 60 (2008). 
 23.  Id. at 352–53, 658 S.E.2d at 64–65. 
 24.  Id. at 352–54, 658 S.E.2d at 64–65. 
 25.  See id. at 351–54, 658 S.E.2d at 63–65 (quoting State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 
268, 275, 498 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1998)). 
 26.  See State v. Hurd, __ N.C. App. __, __, 784 S.E.2d 528, 536 (2016); State v. 
Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 280, 498 S.E.2d 823, 831 (1998). When reviewing these and all 
other Batson claims discussed in this Article, the North Carolina appellate courts review 
the trial court’s ruling for clear error rather than conducting a de novo review of the claim. 
 27.  129 N.C. App. 268, 498 S.E.2d 823 (1998). 
 28.  Cofield, 129 N.C. App. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 830. 
 29.  Id. at 272, 498 S.E.2d at 827. 
 30.  Id. at 270–73, 498 S.E.2d at 826–28. 
 31.  See id. at 277–80, 498 S.E.2d at 830–32. 
 32.  __ N.C. App. __, __, 784 S.E.2d 528 (2016). 
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asked on voir dire about the death penalty, stated “I would say before 
I came here I ha[d] no problem”; “I think that’s what we need to be 
done”;“I don’t like the fact that someone’s life [is] being taken”; and 
“there’s a punishment for a crime.”33 Upon the State’s Batson 
objection, the defendant stated two race-neutral reasons for the 
strike: the juror’s pro-death penalty statements and his own subjective 
feeling the juror was “in favor of capital punishment as a matter of 
disposition.”34 The trial court engaged in extensive comparative juror 
analysis, concluded the defendant’s stated reasons were “pretextual,” 
and disallowed the challenge.35 On appeal, the court engaged in 
comparative juror analysis, comparing the voir dire answers regarding 
the death penalty of the challenged white juror and another 
unchallenged “Asian/Black” juror, and upheld the finding of a 
reverse Batson violation.36 
In light of North Carolina’s history of racial discrimination in 
criminal justice,37 it is indeed disturbing that two “reverse Batson” 
cases involving black defendants’ challenges of white jurors are the 
only cases in North Carolina appellate history finding substantive 
Batson violations where attorneys have provided reasons for strikes. 
In sum, in all the 114 North Carolina appellate Batson cases involving 
minority jurors decided on the merits since 1986, the courts have 
never found a substantive Batson violation where a prosecutor has 
managed to articulate even one reason, however fantastic, for the 
peremptory challenge. 
II.  THE MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY STUDY 
North Carolina’s remarkable appellate Batson record, including 
its Supreme Court’s record of not finding a single substantive Batson 
violation in thirty years, might lead one to conclude that racial 
discrimination in North Carolina jury selection is a thing of the past. 
However, recent academic studies show that this conclusion is simply 
not true. In 2011, researchers at Michigan State University College of 
Law conducted a comprehensive study of over 7,400 peremptory 
strikes made by North Carolina prosecutors in 173 capital cases tried 
 
 33.  Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 531–32. 
 34.  See id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 532. 
 35.  Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 532–33. 
 36.  Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 531–32, 536–37. 
 37.  See generally Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and The 
Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 
(2010) (examining the impact of racial bias on the imposition of the death penalty in North 
Carolina and the implications of the Racial Justice Act). 
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between 1990 and 2010.38	The study showed prosecutors struck 52.6% 
of eligible black jurors and only 25.7% of all other eligible jurors in 
those capital trials.39 The probability of this disparity occurring in 
race-neutral jury selection is less than one in ten trillion.40 This 
disparity was significantly greater in cases involving black defendants, 
where the average strike rate of eligible black jurors was 60%.41 After 
adjusting for race-neutral characteristics, researchers found 
prosecutors struck black jurors at 2.48 times the rate they struck all 
other jurors.42 As one commentator has noted with regard to the 
state’s use of peremptory strikes in North Carolina criminal trials, 
“[t]he impact of race is neither theoretical nor minor, but real and 
substantial,”43 and discriminatory peremptory strikes continue to be a 
powerful mechanism for exclusion of black jurors from participation 
in the criminal justice system.44 
III.  NORTH CAROLINA’S MISAPPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT BATSON JURISPRUDENCE 
An analysis of North Carolina’s appellate Batson record begs the 
question: why is this record so remarkable and disappointing? The 
most likely answer is that North Carolina courts routinely misapply 
United States Supreme Court Batson jurisprudence, most notably at 
steps one and three of the Batson framework. 
 
 38.  See Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The 
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina 
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1542–43 (2012) (reporting on the study). 
 39.  Id. at 1548. 
 40.  NORTH CAROLINA RACIAL JUSTICE ACT JURY SELECTION STUDY 22 (2010); 
Order Granting Motion for Appropriate Relief at 58, State v. Robinson, 91-CRS-23143 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/RobinsonRJAOrder
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3P4-J7A2]. 
 41.  Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 38, at 1549–50. 
 42.  Id. at 1553. 
 43.  Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina 
Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 103, 132–34 (2012). 
 44. Preliminary findings from a study of jury selection in all non-capital North 
Carolina felony trials from 2011–2012, involving 22,000 potential jurors, conducted by 
Wake Forest University School of Law professors “indicate that prosecutors strike non-
white potential jurors at a disproportionate rate. In these cases, prosecutors struck 16 
percent of non-white potential jurors, while they struck only 8 percent of white potential 
jurors.” Kami Chavis, The Supreme Court Didn’t Fix Racist Jury Selection: Timothy Foster 
Got Justice, But Prosecutors Still Have Wide Leeway to Exclude Black Jurors, THE 
NATION (May 31, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-supreme-court-didnt-fix-
racist-jury-selection/ [https://perma.cc/2MUH-QYNS]. 
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A. Misapplications at Batson’s Step One 
Of the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s seventy-four Batson 
cases, thirty-four contain adjudications at Batson’s first step.45 In 
thirty-two of those thirty-four cases, that court wholly or in part 
denied the claim on the ground that the defendant failed to establish 
a prima facie case.46 Indeed, in one of those thirty-two cases, that 
court reversed a decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
finding a prima facie case.47 Overall, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has found a prima facie case in whole or in part in only three 
of the thirty-four cases it reviewed.48 The record in the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals is equally remarkable. In fourteen of the 
sixteen cases raising issues at Batson’s first step that court denied 
relief on the ground that the defendant failed to establish a prima 
facie case.49 
North Carolina appellate courts misapply the law in many ways 
as they review Batson claims at the step one prima facie case stage, 
including: (1) failing to give meaningful weight to the relevant prima 
facie case circumstance of a pattern of strikes against prospective 
minority jurors; (2) giving considerable weight to imagined and 
unarticulated possible reasons for strikes gleaned from juror voir dire 
responses; and (3) imposing a far too onerous burden of proof on 
defendants at Batson’s first step. 
1.  Failure to Give Weight to a Pattern of Strikes 
In Batson, the Court held that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire” is an important relevant 
circumstance that itself could “give rise to an inference of 
 
 45.  See infra Addendum, Table 1 & 3; see also State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 342–45, 
572 S.E.2d 108, 126–28 (2002); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 123–27, 400 S.E.2d 712, 725–28 
(1991). 
 46.  See infra Addendum, Table 3. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviews 
race-based and gender-based discrimination claims under the same general framework, 
and in two cases that court has denied gender-based discrimination claims on the ground 
the defendant did not establish a prima facie case. State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 403–04, 508 
S.E.2d 496, 510 (1998); State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 595–97, 473 S.E.2d 269, 286–87 (1996). 
 47.  State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 145–46, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189–90 (1995). Justices Frye 
and Webb dissented in Quick, arguing the court was unwilling to draw the line on Batson. 
Id. at 147, 462 S.E.2d at 190 (Frye, J., dissenting). 
 48.  See cases cited supra note 16. In Hoffman, the court denied the claim at step one 
as to some jurors and allowed the claim at step one as to others. State v. Hoffman, 348 
N.C. 548, 551–55, 500 S.E.2d 718, 720–23 (1998). 
 49.  See infra Addendum, Table 4; see also State v. McCord, 140 N.C. App. 634, 653–
54, 538 S.E.2d 630, 645–46 (2000); State v. Hall, 104 N.C. App. 375, 381–84, 410 S.E.2d 76, 
79–81 (1991). 
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discrimination.”50 Misapplying Batson, in at least eighteen cases 
involving more than one peremptory challenge,51 the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina has failed to find error in trial court determinations 
finding no prima facie case even though the prosecutor struck 50% or 
more of minority jurors in the tendered qualified pool.52 In two cases, 
that court refused to find a prima facie case when the prosecutor 
struck 100% of the minority jurors tendered.53 In four cases, the court 
refused to find a prima facie case when the prosecutor struck or 
attempted to strike 69% or more of qualified minority jurors.54 In an 
additional six cases, the court refused to find a prima facie case when 
the prosecutor’s strike rate of minority jurors was 60% or higher.55 In 
two other cases, the court refused to find a prima facie case when the 
prosecutor’s strike rate was higher than 50%.56 
Finally, in four cases, the court refused to find a prima facie case 
when the strike rate was 50%.57 The North Carolina Court of Appeals 
has similarly refused to find prima facie cases when prosecutors have 
 
 50.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986). 
 51.  Approximately ten of the thirty-four cases involve only one strike. See infra 
Addendum, Table 3. 
 52.  See cases cited infra notes 51–55. 
 53.  State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 342–43, 611 S.E.2d 794, 807–08 (2005) (three of 
three, 100%); State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 357–60, 471 S.E.2d 379, 385–87 (1996) (two 
of two, 100%). 
 54.  State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 318–20, 500 S.E.2d 668, 683–84 (1998) (three of 
four challenged when juror Hudson struck, 75%; four of five challenged when juror 
Watkins struck, 80%); State v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 740–41, 430 S.E.2d 248, 252 (1993) 
(nine of thirteen, 69%); State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 618–19, 386 S.E.2d 418, 423 (1989) 
(eight of eleven, 73%); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 491–92, 356 S.E.2d 279, 295 (1987) 
(seven of nine, 78%). 
 55.  State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 275–76, 677 S.E.2d 796, 805–06 (2009) (five of eight 
challenged when juror Simmons struck, 63%); State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 528–29, 669 
S.E.2d 239, 254–55 (2008) (three of five, 60%); State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 137–41, 505 
S.E.2d 277, 288–90 (1998) (two of three challenged when juror Cummings struck, 67%); 
State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 550–53, 500 S.E.2d 718, 720–22 (1998) (two of three 
challenged when juror Cox struck, 67%); State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 398–99, 459 
S.E.2d 638, 657 (1995) (five of eight, 63%); State v. Abbott, 320 N.C. 475, 480–82, 358 
S.E.2d 365, 369–70 (1987) (three of five, 60%). 
 56.  State v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 262–63, 524 S.E.2d 28, 37–38 (2000) (six of eleven, 
55%); State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 219, 372 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1988), vacated on other 
grounds, 494 U.S. 1021 (1990) (ten of seventeen, 59%). 
 57.  State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 24–25, 558 S.E.2d 109, 127 (2002) (four of eight, 
50%); State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 527, 476 S.E.2d 349, 355 (1996) (one of two, 50%); 
State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 145–46, 462 S.E.2d 186, 189–90 (1995) (two of four, 50%); 
State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 153–60, 347 S.E.2d 755, 762–64 (1986) (six of twelve, 50%, 
although this case was decided under the Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury guarantee 
rather than Batson because the jury selection took place before Batson was rendered). 
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struck 80%,58 75%,59 71%,60 and 50%61 of qualified minority jurors. 
The repeated failure to find a prima facie case of discrimination 
where the record shows a pattern of striking 50% or more of qualified 
minority jurors shows the North Carolina appellate courts give little 
to no weight to the “pattern of strikes” circumstance in adjudicating 
claims under Batson’s first step, except perhaps when the challenged 
jurors are white.62 Indeed, in a perversion of Batson, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina frequently asserts that a strike rate of 57.2% 
is “some evidence that there was no discriminatory intent”63 and 
routinely cites cases with strike rates of over 50% as “tend[ing] to 
refute an allegation of discrimination.”64 
2.  Imagining Reasons for Strikes 
In determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie 
case under Batson, the North Carolina appellate courts consistently 
conjure race-neutral reasons for strikes gleaned from juror voir dire 
responses and then impute those imagined reasons to the prosecutor 
or judge who never articulated them. In Miller-El v. Dretke,65 
commonly referred to as Miller-El II, the United States Supreme 
Court condemned this practice, stating that “[a] Batson challenge 
does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis” for 
 
 58.  See State v. Cherry, 141 N.C. App. 642, 647–48, 541 S.E.2d 205, 208 (2000) 
(twelve of fifteen, 80%). 
 59.  See State v. Mills, 225 N.C. App. 773, 780, 741 S.E.2d 427, 431–32 (2013) (three of 
four, 75%). 
 60.  See State v. Carmon, 169 N.C. App. 750, 756, 611 S.E.2d 211, 215 (2005) (five of 
seven, 71%). 
 61.  See, e.g., State v. Moore, 167 N.C. App. 495, 500, 606 S.E.2d 127, 130 (2004) (two 
of four, 50%); State v. Robinson, 97 N.C. App. 597, 600, 389 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1990) (three 
of six, 50%); State v. McNeill, 99 N.C. App. 235, 241, 393 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1990) (four of 
eight, 50%); State v. Batts, 93 N.C. App. 404, 409, 378 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1989) (two of four, 
50%). 
 62.  In the “reverse Batson” case of State v. Cofield, where the challenged jurors were 
white, the Court of Appeals held striking four of six jurors, or 67%, “reveal[ed] a ‘pattern 
of strikes’ against Caucasian jurors” supporting a prima facie case of discrimination under 
Batson. State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 277, 498 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1998); see supra text 
accompanying notes 26–31. As displayed above, it is disturbing that in at least eleven cases 
a 67% or higher strike rate against minority jurors did not reveal a legally significant 
“pattern of strikes” or raise a prima facie case of discrimination. See supra text 
accompanying notes 53–55, 58–60. 
 63.  See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 121, 400 S.E.2d 712, 725 (1991) (twelve of twenty-
one, citing an acceptance rate of 42.8%); see also State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 632, 452 
S.E.2d 279, 289 (1994). 
 64.  See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 529, 669 S.E.2d 239, 255 (2008); State v. 
Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 285, 449 S.E.2d 556, 561 (1994). 
 65.  545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
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a strike, and criticizing lower courts for “imagin[ing]	.	.	.	reason[s] that 
might not have been shown up as false.”66 
Misapplying this principle, North Carolina appellate courts 
routinely conjure possible legitimate reasons for strikes from juror 
responses during voir dire and then rely on those reasons to uphold 
the finding of no prima facie case. For example, in State v. 
Nicholson,67 the prosecutor struck two jurors without stating a 
reason.68 On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina relied on 
reasons not stated by the prosecutor—the two jurors expressed 
reservations about imposing the death penalty on voir dire—to find a 
prima facie showing had not been made, stating that “[t]he responses 
of these prospective jurors	.	.	.	are relevant to a determination of 
whether defendant has made a prima facie showing.”69 In State v. 
Chapman,70 the appellate court expressed similar sentiments when 
considering a juror’s expressed death penalty reservations and 
another juror’s family criminal history to find that a prima facie case 
had not been made because these responses “provided obvious non-
racial reasons for peremptory challenge.”71 In at least seventeen of its 
thirty-two cases finding no prima facie case, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has relied on a reason it itself had conjured from the 
voir dire to end the Batson inquiry at step one.72 In eight of its 
fourteen cases finding no prima facie case, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals has done the same.73 This practice is error according to the 
framework provided by the United States Supreme Court.74 
 
 66.  Id. at 250–52. 
 67.  355 N.C. 1, 558 S.E.2d 109 (2002). 
 68.  See id. at 22–23, 558 S.E.2d at 125–26. 
 69.  Id. at 23, 558 S.E.2d at 126. 
 70.  359 N.C. 328, 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005). 
 71.  Id. at 343, 611 S.E.2d at 808; see also State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 553, 500 
S.E.2d 718, 722 (1998) (finding no prima facie case because a struck juror’s response 
indicated a connection to defense counsel and for that reason “the State may have feared 
a bias in favor of defendant”). 
 72.  See infra Addendum, Table 5. In the cases listed in Addendum, Tables 5 and 6, 
the reasons cited by the appellate court were not proffered by the respective prosecutors. 
Rather, the courts themselves drew inferences from juror voir dire testimony in the 
record. 
 73.  See infra Addendum, Table 6. 
 74.  See Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The 
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1551–56 
(1991). 
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3.  Imposing an Excessive Burden of Proof 
In Johnson v. California,75 the United States Supreme Court held 
that it is not necessary to fully prove the existence of purposeful 
discrimination or even show discrimination “more likely than not” 
occurred in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson.76 
Instead, the Johnson Court indicated that the burden of proof was far 
less onerous and held that “a defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial 
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”77 
In misapplication of Johnson, the North Carolina appellate 
courts apply a crippling, virtually undefined,78 and far too onerous 
burden of proof on defendants at Batson’s step one. North Carolina 
appellate decisions refusing to find a prima facie case where 
defendants have clearly produced evidence “sufficient to permit 
the	.	.	.	draw[ing] [of] an inference that discrimination has occurred” 
demonstrate the burden of proof applied at Batson’s first step is far 
too strict.79 For example, in State v. Chapman,80 the Supreme Court 
did not find a prima facie case where the prosecutor struck all three 
qualified minority jurors for a 100% minority strike rate, and the 
ultimate all-white jury sentenced the black defendant to death.81 
Similarly, in State v. Robbins,82 the court did not find a prima facie 
case where the prosecutor struck 78% of qualified minority jurors and 
used more peremptory challenges on minority than white jurors to 
produce an all-white jury that sentenced the black defendant to 
death.83 
In State v. Quick,84 the prosecutor struck 50% of qualified 
minority jurors and no white jurors in a case involving a black 
 
 75.  545 U.S. 162 (2005). 
 76.  Id. at 170. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Usually, the Supreme Court of North Carolina does not define the burden of 
proof it imposes in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson. Often, the court 
simply states a defendant “must make a prima facie showing.” See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 
362 N.C. 514, 527, 669 S.E.2d 239, 254 (2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 581 (2009). Sometimes, 
the court overstates the necessary showing. See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 136, 
505 S.E.2d 277, 287 (1998) (requiring the defendant show that “racial discrimination 
appears to have been the motivation for the challenges” (quoting State v. Porter, 326 
N.C.	489, 497, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990))). 
 79.  Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170. 
 80.  359 N.C. 328, 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005). 
 81.  Id. at 342, 611 S.E.2d at 807. 
 82.  319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279 (1987). 
 83.  Id. at 490–92, 356 S.E.2d at 294–95 (seven of nine, 78%). 
 84.  341 N.C. 141, 462 S.E.2d 186 (1995). 
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defendant.85 On initial appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
found a prima facie case and remanded.86 However, on further 
appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that 
there was not sufficient evidence of a prima facie case and no Batson 
error.87 In State v. Gregory,88 the court did not find a prima facie case 
where the prosecutor struck 62.5% of qualified minority jurors and 
used half of the State’s peremptory challenges against minority jurors, 
and the black defendant was sentenced to death.89 Similarly, in State 
v. Davis,90 the court did not find a prima facie case where the 
prosecutor struck 73% of qualified minority jurors and used more 
than half of the State’s peremptory challenges against minority jurors, 
and the black defendant was sentenced to death.91 
To be sure, the Supreme Court of North Carolina occasionally 
states that “a prima facie showing	.	.	.	is not intended to be a high 
hurdle for defendants to cross.”92 However, that court’s actions, 
discussed above, speak much louder than those words. Since 1986, the 
North Carolina appellate courts have made a total of fifty-one 
adjudications at Batson’s step one in cases involving minority jurors 
and found only five prima facie cases.93 This 10% prima facie case 
finding rate belies the “not intended to be a high hurdle” language 
and reveals that, in fact, the North Carolina appellate courts have 
 
 85.  Id. at 143, 146, 462 S.E.2d at 188–89. 
 86.  Id. at 143, 462 S.E.2d at 187–88 (two of four, 50%). 
 87.  Id. at 142–47, 462 S.E.2d at 187–90. 
 88.  340 N.C. 365, 459 S.E.2d 638 (1995). 
 89.  See id. at 398–99, 459 S.E.2d at 657 (five of eight, 62.5%). 
 90.  325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989). 
 91.  Id. at 618–19, 386 S.E.2d at 423 (eight of eleven, 73%); see also State v. Taylor, 
362 N.C. 514, 529, 669 S.E.2d 239, 255 (2008) (refusing to find a prima facie case where the 
prosecutor struck three of five, or 60%, of qualified minority jurors and only two minority 
jurors sat on the ultimate jury); State v. Carmon, 169 N.C. App. 750, 756, 611 S.E.2d 211, 
215 (2003) (holding the same where the prosecutor struck five of seven, or 71%, of 
minority jurors and used all of the State’s peremptory challenges against minority jurors); 
State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 319–20, 500 S.E.2d 668, 684 (1998) (holding the same 
where the prosecutor had challenged three of four, or 75%, of minority jurors at one 
point, and 80% at a later point, even though an earlier challenge had been denied); State 
v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 736–41, 430 S.E.2d 248, 250–52 (1993) (holding the same where the 
prosecutor struck nine of thirteen, or 69%, of qualified minority jurors and used 75% of 
the State’s peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors, and where only two minority 
jurors sat on the ultimate jury); State v. Belton, 318 N.C. 141, 153, 347 S.E.2d 755, 762–63 
(1986) (holding the same in a case involving a black defendant and white victims where 
the prosecutor struck six of twelve, or 50%, of minority jurors and used 57% of the State’s 
peremptory challenges against minority jurors). 
 92.  See, e.g., State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 478, 701 S.E.2d 615, 638 (2010) (quoting 
State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 553, 500 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1998)). 
 93.  See infra Addendum, Tables 3 & 4; see also supra notes 45–49 and accompanying 
text. 
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made Batson’s step one an almost insurmountable barrier for 
defendants to cross. 
B. Misapplications at Batson’s Step Three 
Of the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s seventy-four Batson 
cases, forty-six contain adjudications at Batson’s third step.94 In every 
one of those forty-six cases—100%—that court denied the claim on 
the ground that the defendant failed to establish a case of purposeful 
discrimination.95 The record in the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
is almost equally remarkable. Of the forty Batson cases involving 
minority jurors, twenty-five contain adjudications at Batson’s third 
step.96 In twenty-four of those cases, that court denied the defendant’s 
claim at step three.97 In the sole outlier decision, discussed in Part I, 
the court found a Batson violation only because the prosecutor 
inexplicably never gave a reason for two of the strikes.98 No North 
Carolina appellate court has ever found purposeful discrimination 
against minority jurors under Batson when the prosecutor has 
articulated any reason for the strike. 
North Carolina appellate courts misapply the law in many ways 
as they adjudicate Batson claims at the purposeful discrimination 
stage, including: (1) refusing to recognize and give weight to disparate 
treatment of similarly situated jurors and (2) giving excessive 
deference to findings by the trial judge of no purposeful 
discrimination. 
1.  Ignoring Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Jurors 
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly approved the 
practice of comparing a prosecutor’s disparate treatment of similarly 
situated minority and white jurors even when the jurors are not 
identical in all respects, and held that such disparate treatment is 
powerful evidence of discriminatory intent at Batson’s third step.99 In 
Miller-El II, the Court stated: 
[m]ore powerful than	.	.	.	bare statistics	.	.	.	are side-by-side 
comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck 
 
 94.  See infra Addendum, Table 7. In virtually all of these cases, the court reached the 
step three phase only because it or the trial court skipped the step one phase entirely. 
 95.  See infra Addendum, Table 7. 
 96.  See infra Addendum, Table 8. 
 97.  See infra Addendum, Table 8. 
 98.  State v. Wright, 189 N.C. App. 346, 352–54, 658 S.E.2d 60, 63–65 (2008); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 21–25. 
 99. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 247 n.6 (2005). 
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and white panelists allowed to serve. If a prosecutor’s proffered 
reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an 
otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is 
evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be 
considered at Batson’s third step.100 
The Court called such side-by-side comparisons “comparative juror 
analysis,”101 an approach it had explicitly endorsed as early as 2003 in 
Miller-El v. Cockrell,102 commonly referred to as Miller-El I. In 
dissent, Justice Thomas rejected the legitimacy of comparative juror 
analysis unless the potential jurors were “comparable in all respects 
that the prosecutor proffer[ed] as important.”103 The Miller-El II 
majority flatly rejected Justice Thomas’ reasoning, stating that: 
[n]one of our cases announces a rule that no comparison is 
probative unless the situation of the individuals compared is 
identical in all respects, and there is no reason to accept 
one	.	.	.	A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim 
unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave 
Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of 
cookie cutters.104 
In Foster v. Chatman,105 the United States Supreme Court 
recently compared treatment of black and white jurors, even though 
they seemingly shared only one common trait, and found 
“compelling” evidence of disparate treatment and purposeful 
discrimination.106	The Court stated: “[s]till other explanations given 
by the prosecution, while not explicitly contradicted by the record, 
are difficult to credit because the State willingly accepted white jurors 
with the same traits that supposedly rendered [the struck black juror] 
an unattractive juror.”107 The Court then individually examined the 
given “explanations” trait by trait, such as age and marital status, and 
 
 100.  Id. at 241; see Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016). 
 101.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 241. 
 102.  537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
 103.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice 
Thomas also stated that “	‘[s]imilarly situated’ does not mean matching any one of several 
reasons the prosecution gave for striking a potential juror—it means matching all	 of 
them.” Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 362–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 104.  Id. at 247 n.6. The Court then actually performed painstaking comparative juror 
analysis of jurors who had “strong similarities as well as some differences,” found 
disparate treatment, and held that this disparate treatment was a strong factor proving 
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 241–52; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483–85 
(2008). 
 105.  136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). 
 106.  Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1750–54. 
 107.  Id. at 1750. 
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found meaningful discrimination between black and white jurors even 
though the disparate treatment related solely to one common trait.108 
Further, the compared jurors in Foster were far from identical: a black 
juror whose son had a criminal conviction was compared to white 
jurors whose sons did not have convictions; and a black juror whose 
wife worked at a mental hospital was compared to a white juror who 
no longer worked at the hospital.109 
Remarkably, both before and after Miller-El I and II, no North 
Carolina appellate court has ever relied on comparative juror analysis 
to find a Batson violation in a case involving minority jurors. Indeed, 
the courts have improperly and consistently refused to engage in 
comparative juror analysis unless jurors were identical in all respects, 
and routinely disregarded disparate treatment of similarly situated 
jurors, as defined in Miller-El II, in adjudicating purposeful 
discrimination at Batson’s third step.110 In decisions before Miller-El I 
and II, such as State v. Williams,111 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina refused to give any weight to disparate treatment of jurors 
unless the jurors were exactly identical, holding that “[d]isparate 
treatment of prospective jurors is not necessarily dispositive on the 
issue of discriminatory intent	.	.	.	.	Because the ultimate decision to 
accept or reject a given juror depends on consideration of many 
relevant characteristics, one or two characteristics between jurors will 
rarely be directly comparable.”112 In State v. Porter,113 the court held 
that “alleged disparate treatment of prospective jurors would not be 
dispositive necessarily	.	.	.	.	Rarely will a single factor control the 
 
 108.  Id. at 1750–54. 
 109.  Id. at 1751–54. 
 110.  The only exceptions are the “reverse Batson” cases of State v. Hurd, __ N.C. App. 
__, __, 784 S.E.2d 528, 534 (2016), and State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 270, 277, 498 
S.E.2d 823, 826, 830 (1998), where the challenged jurors were white. In Cofield, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals applied comparative juror analysis even though the black and 
white jurors merely “parall[ed]” each other and had “almost	.	.	.	identical credentials.” 
Cofield, 129 N.C. App. at 270, 498 S.E.2d at 826; see supra text accompanying notes 21–32. 
In Hurd, the court employed comparative juror analysis even though the minority and 
white jurors’ answers were not identical; the face of the decision shows the jurors gave 
only one similar answer regarding the death penalty, those two answers were not identical 
(“probably about a four” versus “four” on a hypothetical death penalty scale), and there is 
no indication the unchallenged juror ever similarly stated “there’s a punishment for a 
crime.” Hurd, __ N.C. App. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 532–36. These cases are the only cases in 
North Carolina appellate history utilizing comparative juror analysis to find a Batson 
violation. These two cases also happen to be reverse Batson cases disallowing black 
defendants’ challenges of white jurors. 
 111.  339 N.C. 1, 452 S.E.2d 245 (1994). 
 112.  Id. at 18, 452 S.E.2d at 256. 
 113.  326 N.C. 489, 391 S.E.2d 144 (1990). 
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decision-making process.”114 The court rejected comparison of jurors 
who were not identical in all respects, stating: 
This approach fails to address the factors as a totality which 
when considered together provide an image of a 
juror	.	.	.	.	“[M]erely because some of the observations regarding 
each stricken venireperson may have been equally valid as to 
other members of the venire who were not challenged [does 
not] require[ ]	.	.	.	finding the reasons were pretextual.”115 
In decisions after Miller-El I and II, the North Carolina appellate 
courts have obstinately continued to refuse to engage in comparative 
juror analysis unless jurors were identical in all respects. For example, 
in the 2004 decision in State v. Bell,116 the State struck a black juror 
allegedly because her foster child was seeking psychiatric treatment, 
but passed a white juror who “worked with and around psychologists 
on a daily basis” and other white jurors who had “connections to the 
psychiatric field.”117 The State struck another black juror allegedly 
because she had been charged with a crime, although the charges 
were “dropped,” and because she had a child with special needs; 
however, the State passed white jurors whose relatives were convicted 
and charged with crimes and other white jurors “with previous 
experiences in the criminal justice system.”118 On appeal, the Bell 
court insisted the jurors were “not	.	.	.	similarly situated individuals” 
and rejected the defendant’s disparate treatment claims “because the 
same combination of factors was not present in the other two 
prospective jurors” and “no juror had experienced all	.	.	.	the 
circumstances that caused the State to dismiss” a minority juror.119 In 
 
 114.  Id. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152. 
 115.  Id. at 501, 391 S.E.2d at 152–53 (quoting State v. Thomas, 780 S.W.2d 128, 131 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989)); see also State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 80, 451 S.E.2d 543, 554 (1994) 
(stating that disparate treatment not demonstrated “[e]ven if the responses of these eleven 
[unchallenged] jurors were similar to those of” struck black juror), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Hurst, 360 N.C. 181, 624 S.E.2d 309 (2006); State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 
423, 432, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991). 
 116.  359 N.C. 1, 603 S.E.2d 93 (2004). 
 117.  Id. at 13–14, 603 S.E.2d at 103. 
 118.  Id. at 14–16, 603 S.E.2d at 103–04. 
 119.  Id. at 13–16, 603 S.E.2d at 103–04; see also State v. McClain, 169 N.C. App. 657, 
669, 610 S.E.2d 783, 791 (2005) (rejecting comparative juror analysis unless jurors were 
identical); State v. Littlejohn, 158 N.C. App. 628, 633, 582 S.E.2d 301, 305 (2003) (same). 
In contrast to Bell, the United States Supreme Court saw sufficient similarities to conduct 
meaningful comparative juror analysis between a black juror who was struck allegedly in 
part because his wife currently worked at a mental hospital and a white juror who was 
passed even though she had once, but did not currently, work at that same hospital. Foster 
v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016). 
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other post-Miller-El I decisions, North Carolina courts have simply 
not addressed the disparate treatment claims made by defendants and 
failed to perform any comparative juror analysis.120 
In State v. Waring,121 the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s 
most recent Batson case, the court cited Miller-El II and indicated it 
might be more open to comparative juror analysis and disparate 
treatment claims.122 However, on closer inspection, Waring’s holdings 
and results clearly show that the court continues to misapply the law 
and require that jurors be identical in all respects before it will find 
probative disparate treatment. In Waring, the prosecutor struck a 
black juror primarily because she had been charged—but not 
prosecuted—for driving a car with an altered vehicle identification 
number (“VIN”), and because her jury questionnaire and voir dire 
were inconsistent with court records.123 The prosecutor then passed a 
white juror who had twice been convicted of drunk driving and whose 
jury questionnaire and voir dire were also inconsistent with court 
records.124 Although there were only very minor differences between 
the jurors,125 the appellate court held that the jurors “were not 
similarly situated” and consequently found no significance in the 
prosecutor’s disparate treatment.126 At the same trial, the prosecutor 
also challenged a black juror who stated personal opposition to the 
death penalty when first asked but later qualified her answer by 
pledging three times that she could impose death and was not 
predisposed to life; however, the prosecutor passed two white jurors 
who “expressed various opinions about the death penalty” when 
 
 120.  See State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 340–43, 611 S.E.2d 794, 806–08 (2005); State 
v. James, 230 N.C. App. 346, 354, 750 S.E.2d 851, 857 (2013). 
 121.  364 N.C. 443, 701 S.E.2d 615 (2010). 
 122.  Id. at 487, 701 S.E.2d at 643 (“While a prosecutor’s reason for exercising a 
peremptory challenge can appear race-neutral when standing alone, a comparative 
analysis [of jurors] may provide a more reliable gauge of its plausibility.”). 
 123.  Id. at 489–90, 701 S.E.2d at 644. 
 124.  Id. at 490–91, 701 S.E.2d at 644–45. 
 125.  The record does not support the prosecutor’s claim the black juror did not have a 
position on the death penalty; the juror said three times she had thought about the death 
penalty, she could vote for death, she would not be reluctant to perform her duties, and 
her position was: “I still didn’t come up with a position where I would be swayed in either 
way.” Id. at 481–91, 701 S.E.2d at 640–45. Compare Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 242–
46 (2005) (stating that prosecutor’s reason for strike “mischaracterized [the juror’s] 
testimony” and was discredited), with Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1753–54 (2016) 
(discrediting prosecutor’s assertion that he struck a black juror because the juror 
“appeared to be confused” about his position on the death penalty where the record of 
jury	voir dire	showed the juror “unequivocally voiced his willingness to impose the death 
penalty”). The record suggests the Waring prosecutor ran record checks on black, but not 
white, jurors. Waring, 364 N.C. at 489, 701 S.E.2d at 644. 
 126.  Waring, 364 N.C. at 490–91, 701 S.E.2d at 645. 
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asked and also later qualified their answers.127 The defendant 
indicated that one white juror initially expressed “personal issues” 
with the death penalty but “ultimately stated he could follow the 
law,” and the other said she was “predisposed to life without parole” 
and that death “would not be	‘plan A.’	”128 Although there were no 
other significant differences between the jurors, the appellate court 
found that there was a “definable difference” between the jurors with 
regard to death penalty views, and consequently, no probative 
disparate treatment.129 
These decisions, including the most recent ones in Waring, Bell, 
and Carter, demonstrate that the North Carolina appellate courts 
improperly continue post-Miller-El I and II to refuse to find 
significance in disparate treatment of jurors unless the jurors are 
identical in all respects, even if those courts do not expressly 
acknowledge that continued practice. Under any reasonable view, the 
black and white jurors in Waring and other cited cases shared very 
strong similarities and were similarly situated as defined in Miller-El 
II. The differences between the Waring jurors were so minor and 
insignificant as to be practically nonexistent; in fact, there were more 
differences between the Miller-El II jurors, who received meaningful 
comparative juror analysis, than there were between the Waring 
jurors who did not. While the Waring prosecutor’s disparate 
treatment of the jurors should have been powerful evidence of 
purposeful discrimination, the disparate treatment was of no 
probative value at all because the North Carolina court incorrectly 
held that the jurors were allegedly “definably different.” Waring 
shows that a determined North Carolina trial or appellate court can 
 
 127.  Id. at 479, 701 S.E.2d at 638. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 475–80, 701 S.E.2d at 636–39; see also State v. Carter, 212 N.C. App. 516, 
522–25, 711 S.E.2d 515, 522–24 (2011) (finding that two black jurors whose relatives were 
incarcerated and one “without	.	.	.	much experience in the community,” were not similarly 
situated to a white juror whose relative was incarcerated, white jurors who had criminal 
records, and two white jurors who were new to the community); State v. Matthews, 162 
N.C. App. 339, 342–43, 595 S.E.2d 446, 449–50 (2004) (holding that the prosecutor’s strike 
of a black juror who had been excused from a jury in a prior case, but failure to strike 
white jurors with similar experience, “does not rise to the level of demonstrating 
discriminatory intent”). Compare State v. McCord, 158 N.C. App. 693, 697–99, 582 S.E.2d 
33, 36 (2003) (holding no disparate treatment when the prosecutor struck a black juror 
who was young, single, and employed “by an unfamiliar business,” but did not strike white 
jurors who were single and employed by unfamiliar businesses because no white juror 
“possessed all three qualities”), with Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1752–53 (comparing disparate 
treatment of a black juror with a young son who had a criminal conviction and white jurors 
with young sons who did not have criminal convictions despite the State’s argument the 
jurors were “not similar”). 
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always find minute differences between what are, in reality, similarly 
situated jurors and then justify ignoring true disparate treatment 
because of those insignificant differences. The North Carolina 
appellate courts have rejected comparative juror analysis and 
disparate treatment claims in more than twenty-five cases as they 
have erroneously refused to acknowledge that disparate treatment 
can be probative even where jurors are not identical in all respects.130 
This continued practice violates the letter and spirit of Miller-El II 
and Foster v. Chatman, and is why the North Carolina appellate 
courts have never found a Batson violation against minority jurors 
employing comparative juror analysis. Indeed, as the Supreme Court 
foresaw in Miller-El II, the practice of requiring an “exactly identical 
white juror” has made Batson and comparative juror analysis 
“inoperable” in North Carolina.131 
2.  Affording Excessive Deference 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the principle 
that, in Batson cases, “the trial court’s decision on the ultimate 
question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the 
sort accorded great deference on appeal and will not be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous.”132 However, the same Court has also 
cautioned that “deference does not imply abandonment or abdication 
of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief[,]” 
and chided reviewing courts for blindly following a trial court’s 
determinations rather than giving “full consideration to the 
substantial evidence” put forth by a defendant in support of a Batson 
claim.133 Later, the Court observed that “[i]f any facially neutral 
reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge, then Batson would not 
amount to much more than Swain. Some stated reasons are false, 
and	.	.	.	some false reasons are shown up within the four corners of a 
given case[.]”134 Further, in Snyder v. Louisiana,135 the Court 
recognized that such high deference is inappropriate where the 
prosecutor alleges a demeanor-based reason for a strike but the trial 
court fails to “[make] a finding that an attorney credibly relied on 
demeanor in exercising [the] strike.”136 
 
 130.  See infra Addendum, Table 9. 
 131.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 247 n.6 (2005). 
 132.  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 
500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991)). 
 133.  Id. at 340–41. 
 134.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240. 
 135.  552 U.S. 472 (2008). 
 136.  See id. at 479. 
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Misapplying these holdings, North Carolina appellate courts 
afford far too much deference to trial courts and conduct cursory 
review of Batson claims at best. Indeed, in review of almost every 
Batson claim within the jurisdiction, the appellate courts rely on the 
proposition that “[a] trial court’s rulings regarding race-neutrality and 
purposeful discrimination are largely based on evaluations of 
credibility and should be given great deference” and hold no violation 
without considered analysis of the claim.137  
This toothless review in Batson cases is especially improper in 
light of the dubious reasons North Carolina prosecutors routinely give 
for their peremptory challenges of minority jurors at the second step 
of the Batson framework. Review of the Batson cases shows a 
surprisingly large number of prosecutors’ reasons are based on 
alleged juror demeanor, such as jurors’ body language or failure to 
make appropriate eye contact.138 An even larger number of 
 
 137.  See, e.g., State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 469–70, 546 S.E.2d 575, 586–87 (2001). In 
contrast, the North Carolina Court of Appeals conducted an exhaustive review of the 
State’s Batson claim in the reverse Batson case of State v. Hurd, __ N.C. App. __, 784 
S.E.2d 528 (2016). There, although the court accorded great deference to the trial court’s 
determination, it also extensively compared the voir dire answers of the challenged white 
juror to those of an unchallenged “Asian/Black” juror, examined the entire context of the 
strike, including a pre-trial motion that was not in the appellate record, and even faulted 
the defendant’s reasons for the strike as somehow “fail[ing] to resolve” other statements 
made by the challenged juror on voir dire. Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 532–33, 535–36. Then, 
the court rejected the defendant’s proffered reasons even though they were the very same 
type of reasons the court has routinely accepted in previous cases involving strikes of 
minority jurors. See id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 537. This reverse Batson decision, 
notwithstanding its deference to the trial court, is one of the few North Carolina appellate 
cases to exhaustively review a Batson claim and truly scrutinize the reasons proffered for 
the strike. Again, it is troublesome that one of the few North Carolina cases to fully 
consider a Batson claim on appeal involves a reverse Batson claim rather than one 
involving minority jurors. 
 138. See, e.g., State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 434, 502 S.E.2d 563, 575 (1998). For 
example, prosecutors claimed to have struck minority jurors in part because they “sat with 
[their] arms crossed,” State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 549, 508 S.E.2d 253, 263 (1998); 
answered questions “with [their] arms folded,” State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 95, 443 
S.E.2d 306, 313 (1994); and were “leaning away” from the prosecutor, State v. Lyons, 343 
N.C. 1, 12, 468 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1996). Other prosecutors have claimed they struck 
minority jurors because the jurors were allegedly “nervous,” State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 
125, 400 S.E.2d 712, 727 (1991); “head-strong,” State v. Floyd, 115 N.C. App. 412, 415, 445 
S.E.2d 54, 57 (1994); “soft-spoken,” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 668, 483 S.E.2d 396, 409 
(1997); “belligerent,” Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 434, 502 S.E.2d at 575; “hostile,” State v. 
Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 255, 368 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1988); or because the jurors were 
“smiling,” State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 139, 505 S.E.2d 277, 289 (1998). When 
contradictory reasons, such as both “hostile” and “smiling,” are legitimate, it would seem 
very hard for the State to lose. Compare State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 211–13, 481 S.E.2d 
44, 58–59 (1997) (reviewing a prosecutor’s striking of a black juror because she was “not a 
local person” and another black juror who had too many community ties), with Foster v. 
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748, 1751 (2016) (discrediting proffered reasons for 
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prosecutors’ reasons are based on even more subjective juror 
characteristics and allegedly based on their opinion that the juror was 
evasive, immature, confrontational, authoritarian, equivocal, 
misleading, hesitant, or uncertain.139 Further, many prosecutorial 
reasons are not based on facts found in the record or proved to be 
true. Thus, prosecutors frequently claim their strikes of minority 
jurors are based on record checks they performed before trial, 
information from a police officer or prosecutor’s office staff member, 
or information the prosecutor says he or she knows to be true that 
conflicts with the juror’s questionnaire or voir dire answers.140 
Prosecutors often cite reasons that are totally unrelated to the case 
being tried and seemingly fantastic. For example, a prosecutor 
claimed to have struck a minority juror because the juror was 
“physically attractive.”141 These reasons, all of which have been 
accepted by North Carolina trial and appellate courts, “reek[ ] of 
afterthought.”142 
Orders issued in 2012 by Gregory Weeks, a North Carolina trial 
judge in Cumberland County, in connection with Racial Justice Act 
 
peremptory strikes where the prosecutor struck one black juror in part because he asked 
to be excused from jury service and another black juror in part because she did not ask to 
be excused from jury service). 
 139.  See, e.g., Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 434–35, 502 S.E.2d at 575 (reviewing a prosecutor’s 
striking of a juror based on the juror’s “air of defiance”). Other alleged reasons have 
included the juror’s “rather militant animus,” State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 430, 533 
S.E.2d 168, 213 (2000); the juror’s “non-verbal communication suggested hostility and 
indifference,” Jackson, 322 N.C. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 841; and that the juror was 
“potentially less responsible,” Barnes, 345 N.C. at 211, 481 S.E.2d at 58. Still other reasons 
include that the prosecutor “just did not feel comfortable with [the juror’s] answers and 
her demeanor,” State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 358, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386 (1996); “didn’t 
get a good sense that [the juror] ha[s] a good sense of herself,” State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 
443, 478, 710 S.E.2d 615, 638 (2010); or “perceived ‘some reluctance’	” in the juror’s 
answers, State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 134, 456 S.E.2d 789, 796 (1995). 
 140.  See, e.g., Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 434, 502 S.E.2d at 575; State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 
419, 436–38, 467 S.E.2d 67, 76–77 (1996). 
 141.  Barnes, 345 N.C. at 210–11, 481 S.E.2d at 58. Other asserted reasons include that 
the juror “had never held a professional position,” State v. Martin, 105 N.C. App. 182, 187, 
412 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1992); the juror had an “alleged acquaintance with [the] defendant’s 
former girlfriend,” State v. Pender, 218 N.C. App. 233, 239, 720 S.E.2d 836, 840 (2012); the 
juror was “not promoted in the military as [soon as the prosecutor thought] he should 
have been,” State v. Floyd, 343 N.C. 101, 105, 468 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1996); and the juror had 
“personal problems” with her own daughter, State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 14, 603 S.E.2d 93, 
104 (2004). In State v. Best, the court explicitly expressed that it would approve 
“implausible or even fantastic” reasons. 342 N.C. 502, 511, 467 S.E.2d 45, 51 (1996).	But 
see Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1752 (finding that the prosecutor’s implausible’ and ‘fantastic’ 
assertion” supported the Court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s reason for striking the 
juror was “pretextual”). 
 142.  Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246 (2005)). 
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litigation show the regularity with which North Carolina prosecutors 
offer pretextual reasons for peremptory strikes at Batson’s step two.143 
Judge Weeks’ orders surveyed a large number of criminal cases not 
discussed here, and reveal that the reasons prosecutors gave for 
strikes in those cases were often subjective, irrelevant, and thinly-
disguised pretext for racial discrimination.144 Judge Weeks also found 
that in the 1990s North Carolina prosecutors circulated and used a 
“cheat sheet” of approved reasons for minority strikes that included 
such reasons as “lack of eye contact,” “air of defiance,” “arms 
folded,” “leaning away from questioner,” and “evasive.”145 The 
similarity between the reasons listed in the “cheat sheet” and the 
reasons given in the cases discussed here further demonstrates the 
given reasons were pure pretext.146 
In light of the highly suspect nature of the reasons North 
Carolina prosecutors give for minority juror strikes at Batson’s step 
two, the failure of the appellate courts to weigh the validity of those 
reasons and find purposeful discrimination at Batson’s step three is 
especially improper. Under correct review at Batson’s third step, “the 
persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant	.	.	.	[and] 
implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”147 North Carolina 
appellate courts, however, accept fanciful reasons as race-neutral and 
do not consider their unpersuasive nature when determining whether 
purposeful discrimination has occurred. North Carolina appellate 
courts routinely grant too much deference even where the State’s 
reasons are weak, the trial court has not made a demeanor-based 
factual finding, and there is strong evidence of purposeful 
discrimination. 
 
 143.  See Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at 1–6, State v. Golphin, 97-
CRS-47314-15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja_order
_12-13-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV6V-VDQ5]; Order Granting Motion for Appropriate 
Relief, supra note 40, at 1–3. 
 144.  Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief, supra note 143, at 112–36. 
 145.  Id. at 73–77. 
 146.  Without expressing any opinion on the findings, conclusions, or substantive 
merits of Judge Weeks’ orders, on December 18, 2015, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina vacated them for procedural error and remanded for further proceedings in the 
trial court. State v. Augustine, 368 N.C. 594, 780 S.E.2d 552 (2015); State v. Robinson, 368 
N.C. 596, 780 S.E.2d 151 (2015).  
 147.  Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (emphasis added). Indeed, in Foster, the 
United States Supreme Court itself conducted an “independent examination of the 
record,” which revealed that much of the prosecutor’s reasoning had “no grounding in 
fact” and many of the prosecutor’s reasons “[could not] be credited.” Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 
1749, 1751. 
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For example, in State v. Thomas148 the prosecutor struck seven of 
eight eligible black prospective jurors in a case involving a black 
defendant and a white victim.149 While the prosecutor said he struck 
jurors because “one was young and unmarried, and not as stable and 
mature as the State preferred; one had never before thought about 
the death penalty and appeared evasive; [and] one was young and 
stated that serving on the jury would work hardship on his job 
because he traveled a lot”; the defendant argued on appeal that these 
reasons were pretext since the State failed to strike white jurors with 
the same characteristics.150 Despite the high minority strike rate, the 
State’s weak and subjective reasons, no apparent factual finding by 
the trial court regarding one juror’s alleged evasiveness, and evidence 
showing pretext, the Supreme Court of North Carolina nonetheless 
accorded the trial court “great deference” and did not find a Batson 
violation.151 In State v. Bell, the court did not find a Batson violation 
even though the prosecutor struck nine of eleven minority jurors, 
gave demeanor-based reasons for strikes, passed similarly situated 
white jurors, and the trial court apparently made no factual 
findings.152 
In State v. Fletcher,153 a case involving a black defendant and a 
white female victim, the prosecutor challenged two of the first three 
black jurors, disparately questioned black juror Greene, and did not 
challenge white jurors who gave answers similar to Greene.154 
Further, the trial court found the prosecutor’s challenge to another 
black juror was racially discriminatory.155 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina accorded “great deference” and did not find 
a Batson violation as to Greene.156 In State v. Lyons,157 the State 
struck three minority prospective jurors allegedly because one “was 
 
 148.  329 N.C. 423, 407 S.E.2d 141 (1991). 
 149.  Id. at 432, 407 S.E.2d at 147 (seven of eight, 87.5%). 
 150.  Id. at 430, 407 S.E.2d at 146. 
 151.  Id. at 431–33, 407 S.E.2d at 146–48. Similarly, in State v. Bond, that court 
incorrectly afforded “much deference” and did not recognize a Batson violation where the 
State used eight of nine peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors 
(approximately 89%); the juror at issue was allegedly struck because he “expressed some 
hesitation and	.	.	.	appeared to be concerned and worried when asked about the death 
penalty,” although there was no indication the trial court made a factual finding as to 
demeanor. 345 N.C. 1, 21, 478 S.E.2d 163, 173 (1996). 
 152.  State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 11–16, 603 S.E.2d 93, 103–05 (2004). 
 153.  348 N.C. 292, 500 S.E.2d 668 (1998). 
 154.  Id. at 314–17, 500 S.E.2d at 681–84. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 313–14, 500 S.E.2d at 680–81. 
 157.  343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996). 
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leaning away from the entire jury selection process,” one was a nurse 
and looked “shocked” and “puzzled” in response to voir dire 
questions, and one did not have a “sufficient stake in the 
community.”158 Although the trial court did not make factual findings 
as to the demeanor of those jurors and the State accepted three white 
jurors who were also nurses, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
nonetheless accorded excessive deference and did not find a Batson 
violation.159 
Similarly, in State v. Tirado160 the State used eight of its first ten 
peremptory strikes against minority prospective jurors in a case 
involving minority defendants and two white victims.161 The 
prosecutor said he struck one juror because he would not maintain 
eye contact and provided short answers on voir dire and another 
because “she didn’t understand sometimes—I don’t—can’t say that 
she wasn’t paying attention. I don’t know. We just don’t know what 
the cause of it was, but we could see the result of that concern was her 
sitting over a long trial[.]”162 Despite the prosecutor’s inability to 
articulate the reason for striking the female juror and absent specific 
factual findings by the trial court as to demeanor, the appellate court 
nonetheless found no error, reasoning that “the trial court was in the 
best position to assess the prosecutor’s credibility.”163 
These cases illustrate the overwhelming tendency of North 
Carolina appellate courts to provide cursory review of Batson claims 
and to afford excessive deference to lower court Batson findings—an 
approach that contrasts sharply with that of the United States 
 
 158.  Id. at 11–13, 468 S.E.2d at 208–09. 
 159.  Id. at 13–14, 468 S.E.2d at 209–10. Similarly, that court afforded “great 
deference” and did not find a Batson violation in Kandies even where the State struck nine 
black prospective jurors, allegedly basing two of the strikes on the opinions of “a source 
within the High Point Police Department” not before the court, and where the defendant 
argued that the State failed to strike similarly situated white prospective jurors. See State 
v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 434–37, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75–76 (1996); Amanda S. Hitchcock, 
Recent Development, “Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief”: The Impact of 
Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Cases, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1328, 1353–55 (2006). Furthermore, in King, the defendant challenged one of the State’s 
six strikes against black prospective jurors. State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 468, 546 S.E.2d 
575, 585–86 (2001). The prosecutor said he struck the juror based on information “from 
another source” not named or in the record and because the juror’s uncle had been 
murdered. Even though the prosecutor admitted the information was totally unconfirmed 
and passed a white juror whose wife had been raped, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina nonetheless afforded the trial court “great deference” and did not recognize a 
Batson violation. Id. at 470–72, 546 S.E.2d at 587–88. 
 160.  358 N.C. 551, 599 S.E.2d 515 (2004). 
 161.  Id. at 568–70, 599 S.E.2d at 528–29 (eight of ten, 80%). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
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Supreme Court over the last ten years. In Foster, Snyder, and Miller-
El II, the state courts did not find Batson violations; however, the 
Supreme Court conducted searching “independent examination of 
the record” and, despite the highly deferential standard of review, 
found clear error in the state courts’ decisions and substantive 
violations.164 These recent decisions clearly indicate that state courts 
are affording excessive deference to lower court Batson findings, a 
message the North Carolina appellate courts seemingly have yet to 
hear.165 
IV.  THE BATSON RECORDS IN NEIGHBORING STATES 
North Carolina’s remarkable appellate Batson record stands in 
sharp contrast to the records of her neighboring states in the Fourth 
Circuit, which have all been much more willing than North Carolina 
to engage in meaningful Batson analysis and hold Batson violations 
when warranted. The records in these states are further evidence 
North Carolina misapplies Batson jurisprudence. Since 1986, the 
appellate records in these neighboring states with respect to 
adjudication of claims of purposeful racial discrimination against 








 164. See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1749, 1755 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472, 485–86 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005). 
 165. In Foster, the Court noted Georgia prosecutors had at times been “downright 
indignant” at accusations they engaged in purposeful racial discrimination under Batson. 
Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755. So too, perhaps, are the North Carolina defense lawyers in the 
reverse Batson cases of Hurd and Cofield, who were similarly found to have violated 
Batson. The authors suggest that any such indignation should instead be focused toward 
state jury selection practices which produce overwhelming statistical disparities that simply 
could not occur in race-neutral jury selection. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98–99 
(1986) (if affirmations of good faith “were accepted as rebutting a defendant’s prima facie 
case, the Equal Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory requirement’	.	.	.	. The 
reality of practice	.	.	.	shows that the [peremptory] challenge may be, and unfortunately at 
times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors”) (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 
294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)). 
 166.  Although appellate courts in neighboring states have found substantive Batson 
violations in civil cases, North Carolina appellate courts have made no such findings. See 
infra Addendum, Table 10 (providing published cases in which courts in neighboring 
states found substantive Batson violations). 
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Appellate Batson Records in Fourth Circuit States Since 1986 
 
State Court Batson Adjudications 
at Step Three 
Number of Batson 
Violations Found 
W. Va. 9 2 
Md. 6 3
Va. 18 3
Va. Ct. App. 13 3 
S.C. 33 11
S.C. Ct. App. 14 2
 
Accordingly, every other court of last resort in virtually every 
state neighboring North Carolina has found at least one substantive 
Batson violation in the last thirty years.167 South Carolina’s has found 
eleven such violations.168 Compare these neighboring states’ records 
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s record of zero violations in 
seventy-four Batson cases and the overall North Carolina appellate 
record of zero violations in 113 Batson cases when the prosecutor has 
stated a reason for striking minority jurors. With regard to Batson 
jurisprudence within the region, North Carolina appears to stand 
alone. 
CONCLUSION 
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court overruled its 
previous decision in Swain v. Alabama, reasoning that Swain “placed 
on defendants a crippling burden of proof” and made “prosecutors’ 
peremptory challenges	.	.	.	largely immune from constitutional 
scrutiny.”169 Unfortunately, over the last thirty years, North Carolina 
has created a remarkable and disappointing appellate Batson record 
by misapplying binding precedent found in Batson and subsequent 
decisions, paying lip service to Batson jurisprudence, and continuing 
to adhere to rejected pre-Batson principles. Thirty years after Batson, 
North Carolina defendants challenging racially discriminatory 
 
 167.  See infra Addendum, Table 10. A 2010 study by the Equal Justice Initiative 
showed the appellate courts in six other southern states—Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana—have all ordered multiple reversals for substantive 
Batson violations and racially-tainted jury selection. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 19–27 
(2010), http://www.eji.org/raceandpoverty/juryselection [https://perma.cc/9YCU-7RLN]. 
Alabama’s appellate courts have ordered over eighty such reversals. Id. 
 168.  See infra Addendum, Table 10. 
 169.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1986). 
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peremptory strikes still face a crippling burden of proof and 
prosecutors’ peremptory challenges are still effectively immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Although Batson has received criticism for not providing the 
most effective tool for eradicating racial discrimination in jury 
selection, the Batson records in North Carolina’s neighboring states 
and the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Foster, Snyder, 
and Miller-El II belie the notion that Batson is completely toothless in 
combating discriminatory peremptory challenges. Further, as recently 
affirmed in Foster, the Batson framework is the law of the land which 
must be given meaningful and correct application in North Carolina 
rather than the cursory nod and misapplication it has received to date. 
Hopefully, Batson’s thirtieth anniversary and the Foster decision will 
be the turning point for North Carolina’s thus far remarkable and 
disappointing appellate Batson record. 
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